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Contemporary Explorations

The four articles in this section were selected because they contain a great
deal of information on different areas of importance—e.g., current practice
issues, models—and because they have stimulated further thinking in these
areas. The first article is "Sociology, Social Work and Social Problems" by
David Kallen, Dorothy Miller and Arlene Daniels. Published in 1968, the article
suggests a coming "rapprochement" between sociology and social work.
At almost every professional meeting on sociological practice, some sociologists will ask about the relationship between sociology and social work.
Someone will want to know why the early women scholar-practitioners are
remembered as social workers while the male university professors are remembered as scientists and sociologists. Others will want to address contemporary
issues such as overlap of interests, differences in theoretical orientations, differences in training requirements and the effect of credentialling by these fields.
This article only begins to address a few of these issues but does provide
insight about the ways in which the fields have "avoided a social change
responsibility" and information about their potential contributions to solving
social problems.
The second article is James Laue's "Sociology as Advocacy: There are No
Neutrals," an excerpt from his 1978 chapter "Advocacy and Sociology." Laue,
known particularly for his work on ethics and on conflict intervention, has
written what might be called a primer for sociologists. Here Laue explains that
"doing sociology in all its forms is social intervention, and that all intervention
is advocacy of one of three types—of party, outcome or process."
The third article in this section, Roger Straus' "Changing the Definition of
the Situation: Toward a Theory of Sociological Intervention," is one of the
more important contemporary articles in the field of clinical sociology. In his
1984 paper, Straus presents a taxonomy of sociological intervention that pays
special attention to varying levels of participation and relates these to intervention targets.
The final article is Joseph DeMartini's "Basic and Applied Sociological
Work," which is excerpted from a longer article by that name which appeared
in 1982. In this article DeMartini defines applied sociology and presents a
typology of basic and applied sociological work.
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Sociology, Social Work and Social
Problems

David J. Kallen
National Institute of Child Health and Human Development
Dorothy Miller
Social Psychiatry Research Associate
Arlene Daniels
San Francisco State College
Both sociology and social work have contributions to make to the solution
of social problems. It seems probable that as social science becomes less academic and more involved in the real world, and as social work becomes less
psychiatrically oriented, there will be an increasing need for the two fields to
cooperate in the solution of social problems. It, therefore, seems appropriate to
discuss the present stance of each discipline with respect to social problems. In
order to do this, we must first define social problems (Lee and Lee, 1949; Frank,
1949; Rose, 1964) and define various ways in which they can be solved.1
For present purposes, we define a social problem as a dislocation or dysfunction in the social system which is regarded by the society as requiring
intervention by its designated agents. In this view, there are three requirements
for a given social condition to be regarded as a social problem:
1) it must be social in origin
2) it must be regarded by the society as a problem
3) it must require some form of social intervention
Currently, social problems are seen in such conditions as: socially created
inequalities in the distribution of income, rights, or education, and in the growing chaos of our major cities. Crime, juvenile delinquency, care of the mentally
Reprinted from The American Sociologist, Vol. 3, No. 3, (1968: 235–240) by permission of the
American Sociological Association. Copyright by the American Sociological Association.
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ill, sexual deviance and other related consequences of these conditions are also
defined as social problems. But if events are not defined as problems by the
society, no social problem exists. For example, changing standards of individual
sexual behavior among middle class persons are not really a social problem.
Although public concern is expressed about such matters, no effort is made by
the society to sanction and regulate sexual activity in this group. However, the
production of illegitimate children among women of low income where the
society must make provision for the support of the infants, is defined as a social
problem. And so society enforces negative sanctions on sexual activity by these
women. The emergence of the "hippy" culture, and the use of psychedelic
drugs, particularly by young people, appears to be emerging as a new social
problem. Significant segments of the society, particularly those with formal
social control responsibilities are urging and enforcing negative sanctions for
use (and possession) of psychedelic drugs. At the same time, there are considerable segments of opinion, particularly young, that support this concern with
inner experience as legitimate. Thus, what one part of society defines as a social
problem another part does not. In fact, the social problem may be more in the
conflicting definitions of legitimacy than in the use of these substances per se.
There are at least four separate ways in which a society can respond to a
recognized social problem:
1) Efforts can be made to ameliorate the negative outcomes or symptoms
without affecting the underlying causes.
2) Attempts can be made at prevention by modifying the single social
institution seen as the source of the problem.
3) Revolutionary restructuring of the society involving major modifications
in the structure and relationship of an interdependent system of social institutions may be attempted.
4) Symptom exacerbation may occur when no clear solution is visible; but
there is a concerted effort by one or more subgroups in the society to exert
pressure. This pressure (Eglinton, 1964:40) is exerted on the theory that any
change is preferable to a continuation of the status quo.2
Each of these response patterns arise from different structural situations,
and each draws social agents from different subspecialties or subgroups within
society. These four patterns can be seen as arising from two different social
processes: prevention and amelioration responses arise from social planning
within established institutional patterns; revolutionary responses and symptom
exacerbations arise from social movements and are patterns of elementary collective behavior (Case, 1964:11).3 The agents of social change vary correspondingly. In the first type of social process, they may come from within the central
structure of the society, being appointed, in effect, by the system, to deal with
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the problems created by the dysfunctional situation. In the second type of social
process, they may be self-selected, coming essentially from outside the established system. Accordingly, amelioration and prevention responses will tend to
be the result of actions by the designated agents of the social system. Revolutionary responses and symptom exacerbation will be instituted by agents who
"emerge as natural leaders" from social movements.
Thus, for example, our public welfare system is a form of amelioration
which is handled essentially by designated agents of the social system. Public
assistance programs are seen as one form of social insurance and are written
into the broader Social Security Act. Social engineers designed public assistance
programs to ameliorate economic distress rather than to attack the inherent flaws
within the economic system. As Franklin D. Roosevelt said (Cohen et al.,
1948:101) in 1934:
We are compelled to employ the active interest of the nation as a
whole through government in order to encourage a greater security
for each individual who composes it.
Such a social plan did not seem to require any basic structural change in
either the social or economic system which was in existence in the United States
during the depression years. This program could be operated with technicians;
e.g., intelligent college graduates who could determine legal eligibility and
administer the financial payments. Currently, however, welfare recipients are
anything but financially or personally secure. Substandard levels of assistance
are provided through a system which has actually developed in a manner which
perpetuates a negative self-image and stifles individual initiative. Such a system
was originally intended to be a solution to the dysfunctions arising from the
inequalities in the distribution of income but it has created another kind of social
problem. Although the negative consequences of absence of income are somewhat ameliorated, the basic causes of poverty are left unchanged or have even
been exacerbated.
While social planning may be devised as an economic or political strategy,
it is often administered by persons who work, not only to administer a law but
also to change the distressed individual, i.e., to change not the system but the
self. Social welfare planning, for example, led to the design of a "law to flatten
out the peaks and valleys of deflation and of inflation—in other words, a law
that will take care of human needs and at the same time provide for the United
States an economic structure of vastly greater soundness (Roosevelt, 1935). "4
But the administration of that law rapidly developed in two divergent paths.
One, the social insurance sections of the Social Security Act, was administered
by government clerks in the private insurance patterns (efficient, rational, impersonal, and equitable). The other, the public assistance section (Galbraith,
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1958:252-253), was administered by professional social workers, who began
to seek for the "causes" of economic distress within individuals. These staffing
patterns of a twin program designed to ameliorate a social problem have had far
reaching consequences.5 Chief among these has been the separation of the poor
into the "deserving" and the "undeserving." The "deserving" poor have had
at least limited success in the labor market, and are, therefore, eligible for
earned insurance benefits through Social Security, a system applied universalistically for all who meet the eligibility requirements. The "undeserving" poor
are dependent on public charity through Public Welfare systems which varies
in eligibility requirements and size of payment from state to state. It should be
noted that the public welfare provisions were originally designed as much to
keep females out of the labor force as to provide support, while presently, at
least in some states, efforts are made to return persons on welfare to the labor
force.
The ameliorative approach to social problems often rests upon the assumption that the individual's psychological responses need to be restructured. In
this view (Furie, 1960; Lubove, 1965), the possibility that social problems arise
from the social system is minimized. Hence, attempts at restructuring the individual personality may represent an effort to adjust the individual to a dysfunctional social situation. The ameliorative approach, then may beg the question
of the underlying difficulty and avoid consideration of more revolutionary and
far reaching solutions to social problems.6
Methods for the resolution of social problems through prevention (Fried,
1963:151-171) follow public health models. In the public health model, once a
disease has been identified and its carriers specified, massive intervention programs are mounted. Such programs push to vaccinate the population against the
disease or to persuade individuals to modify their behaviors so as to eliminate
the disease carriers. However, in the field of social problems, the preventative
approach appears to generate as many new problems as it solves. The preventative approach attempts to change only a given institution; it ignores the systematic interrelationships of institutions within the social structure. Thus, one reason for the development of public housing programs, combined with massive
slum clearance programs, was to provide sanitary housing and other advantages
which would then eliminate crime in the slums. This effort did not take into
consideration the dysfunctional effects of the destruction of existing neighborhood social organizations.7 Nor did it consider the possible deleterious effects
of the new social organization (Beyer, 1965; Wilner et al., 1962; Jacobs, 1961),
creating a great density of unrelated populations. The difficulty of adequate
social controls which characterize the social and physical conditions of the
great, high rise, public housing projects created a whole new complex of social
problems which have not been solved.8
The revolutionary response to social problem has been defined as a
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restructuring of interdependent institutions. The successful American labor
movement represents one example of this type of response. The success of the
labor movement resulted not only in a new relationship between labor and
management; but even more important, it created a new form of social mobility.
In the past, social mobility had essentially been a movement of an individual
through the social system. The labor movement created upward mobility on the
part of entire groups as these groups were able to achieve greater share of the
goods and services of the society, and a greater degree of economic security
(Hardman, 1962:431–436). This restructuring of the form and means of social
mobility (Foster, 1956; Hill, 1957; LaBarre, 1951; Wilensky, 1959; Yinger,
1966), along with other changes in the economic organization of the society,
had repercussions for the education system and the structure, organization, and
function of the family.
The civil rights movement has many of the characteristics of a revolutionary
movement (U.S. Department of Labor, 1965). It appears to be effecting changes
in some of the structures of society.9 However, the civil rights movement also
has many characteristics of the exacerbation response. In many ways, it represents an attempt to achieve change for its own sake without a clear program or
goal. Thus, events such as the Watts' and other riots, tend to exacerbate the
racial tensions. These riots can be seen as events which keep things stirred up
without creating a clear purpose or program.10
In the perspective presented here, social problems have their genesis in the
structure of the social system. And so a concern with their definitions and
solutions may well be the proper concern of sociology. Unfortunately, in recent
years, sociology has avoided this concern, preferring to join with the rest of
society in delegating this task to legislatures, pressure groups, formal agents of
social control, and the profession of social work. For an example of the sociologist's view, Talcott Parsons (1959) reports that sociology is "universally conceived as a scientific discipline which is clearly primarily dedicated to the
advancement and transmission of empirical knowledge in its field and secondarily to the communication of such knowledge to non-members and its utilization
in practical affairs." Parsons clearly feels that the primary role of sociology is
in research and university teaching. Edgar Borgatta (1959) puts the case even
more strongly, reporting that, "Not only can the use of graduate school resources for training practitioners be extremely wasteful, it can also lower the
standards necessary for training research personnel." Borgatta implies the desirability of setting up first and second class citizens in sociology: first class
citizens will obtain their degrees in graduate schools and make careers in university research and teaching; second class citizens will obtain their degrees in
professional schools and end up in some applied field.11
In one recent publication (Mack, 1964:25), the (ideal) social scientist is
described as a "man alienated from his society. ... As citizen, a sociologist
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may have democratic concepts of justice and deplore the ways in which poverty
and racial discrimination cause his society to fall short of its own ideals. But at
work. .. the sociologist must invest his work time in analyzing the effectiveness
of special interest groups, not in cheerleading. . . . Political leaders, educators,
businessmen, church administrators are making policy decisions based upon
data gathered by social scientists. The growing acceptance of science as a frame
of reference can encourage belief that decision makers may come to feel more
at home with science as a frame of mind."
Although science implies prediction and control, few social scientists feel
comfortable about making predictions or recommendations for programs designed to create social change. The decision makers often distrust the so called
scientific "data" offered by "social scientists" who do not, themselves, seem
to see much of genuine scientific worth arising from their work. For example,
a quarter of a century of research in race relations has not led to the development
of effective corrective or remedial social programs for the American Negro. He
has come to know that whatever gain he will make will arise out of political
power, not out of "scientific studies."12
Perhaps the reluctance of many sociologists to enter the social planning
area can be traced to their sense of impotence in the face of the enormous social
problems arising out of our social structure.
There are some positive trends visible in the sociological world, however.
Two new sociological readers, Applied Sociology (Ross, 1965)13 and Social
Welfare Institutions reflect this trend. Zald (1965), for example, states " . . .
But just as it seems to some observers that social work in its drive toward
professionalization, deserted the poor, so, too, sociology, in its pursuit of scientific status, deserted the value-laden problems of social welfare." Almost in a
"reaction formation, social problems and welfare problems become taboo topics
for sociology . . . the study was not quite intellectually respectable."14
If sociology has avoided a social change responsibility, the profession of
social work has done little better. One consequence of the ameliorative approach
in social work has been the focus on what can be called the quality of life of the
client rather than the conditions of life affecting the clients. The quality of life
refers to internal psychological motivations and to personal characteristics of
individuals. The conditions of life refer to the consequences of social structures
and institutions which affect the individuals' opportunities (Matza, 1964; Cloward and Ohlin, 1960). While current trends may focus on personality problems,
the great, early research of social work was concerned with a description of
social conditions. Thus, the work of such pioneers as John Howard (1784) in
his investigation of English prison15 or Charles Booth (1904) in his studies of
London poor pitched social reform to the gathering of information about the
nature of relevant social institutions, as well as life qualities. This type of work
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was also an attempt to locate the social causes of the unacceptable individual
behavior which created social problems.
But the work of these early pioneers came at a time when private fortunes
could support most of the work, and the social system was still simple enough
so that the efforts of one individual could beget the possibility of significant
social change. For example, Dorothea Dix came close to revolutionalizing the
care of the mental patients through a combination of persistence, indignation
and observation.
These surveys and studies reflected the search for causes and carriers of
problems and focused on the preventive approach. The consequences of this
approach can be seen in such social reform movements as prohibition. For the
supporters of the prohibition movement, the hope was that abolition of alcohol
would cure the ills of the immigrant, i.e., poverty, ignorance and disease. When
such attempts proved fruitless—eventually generating more problems than they
solved—the social reform movement fell into disrepute.
The social reformers went on to such issues as the feminist movement. But
the system of social reform had already created government and private agency
structures which led quickly to the professionalization of the helping function.
And these professionals, the social workers, soon became devotees of the personal approach to the solution of social problems. One of the best examples of
the pattern that developed is Mary E. Richmond's Social Diagnosis (1917)
which provided the rationale for the casework method. The mental hygiene
movement added the psychoanalytical and dynamic mystique to the individualist
social approach to problematic persons. The completed product was an ideology
and a rationale for locating all social problems within the individual (Davis,
1935:55–65).
As the social system became more complex, and as the possibility of effective individual action lessened, the change in social work from reform to amelioration became understandable (Eckland, 1967). The great impetus for this
change was twofold: the shift of income maintenance from a private to a public
function and the coincident professionalization of the casework function. If
social work no longer has a significant social change function (in part because
of the complexities of the social system and the increasing difficulty in instituting planned social change) then the focus on the quality of life becomes a
legitimate area of concern. The profession no longer has the right or the responsibility to differentiate between the deserving and the undeserving poor. This
distinction of the deserving poor is now fulfilled by the provision of social
insurance through the Social Security programs. The undeserving poor receive
charity through the Public Welfare program. The distinction between the deserving and undeserving rests on their work history. But different criteria are implicit in social work. In the development of social work philosophy, the unde-
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serving poor do not fulfill the expectations that society has on its members.
This inability can be attributed to the quality of poor people rather than to their
conditions.16 Social work practice thus becomes a mechanism for the maintenance of the status quo, despite the generally egalitarian values of the social
workers. Attention is directed away from the idea that life conditions should be
changed. But if the conditions of life cannot be changed, the quality of individual lives can be—at least in theory—to reduce the discontent and to provide
more individual satisfactions. If the person is unable to find a job, egalitarian
values and the American dream makes it imperative to focus on that individual's
failure rather than economic dislocation or poor preparation for the labor market. Hence, the social worker attempts to manipulate the accessible individual
rather than to restructure the inaccessible institutional bases of his participation—or lack of it—in the labor market.
Under these conditions, it is not surprising that social workers and their
clients do not agree on the problems which the client has, particularly when the
client is lower class. Thus, according to Beck (1962), many lower class clients
were seen by caseworkers in family service society agencies to have problems
different from those presented by the client. Miller (1965) found that on admission to the mental hospital, patients and their families reported quite different
problems from those perceived by the social workers. If what the client needs
is adjustment to a dysfunctional social system, it is not surprising that he and
the worker do not agree on the problem. Mary MacDonald (1960) has claimed
that the social worker is "the keeper of the community's conscience." The idea
of a social conscience, which the social worker should represent, ignores the
significance of different life styles and their relation to place in society and to
the values which are held. These styles and the related values result from the
division of labor, the existence of a social stratification system and consequent
differential opportunities. The values of the social worker and her client are
thus radically different. However, the social worker has greater social power
than the client (Landy, 1960:127-144). And so her notions of values and how
they should be given priorities outweigh those of the client. She can attempt to
impose her values on the client. Thus, the social work view of the community
consciences, derived from middle class training and experience, upholds the
status quo. A more pluralistic view of values and a greater understanding of the
socially determined nature of behavior might lead to a greater emphasis on
revolutionary changes rather than amelioration for the solution of social problems.
It is here that there may be a rapprochement between sociology and social
work. The sociologist, by training, is concerned with the nature and interrelationships of the social system. But there is current disinterest from sociologists
in the practical use of their knowledge and skills for the solution of social
problems. In addition, those sociologists who have shown an interest have been
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disillusioned (Radman and Kolodny, 1965:93–112). Applied sociologists have
complained at length about how they are treated when they intervene in social
issues. Nevertheless, the knowledge and skill of sociologists might help to
create a social accountability system which would in turrn help social work to
understand and help to change the life conditions of those about whom society
is legitimately concerned. If social work has so far been guilty of acting without
conceptualizing, sociology has been guilty of conceptualizing without acting.
The solutions to social problems can strengthen a society as it evolves or
they can tear it apart. The successful solution of a social problem must be
revolutionary in some form; ameliorative and preventative solutions would seem
not to work in the long run, and the exacerbation of symptoms is not a solution.
It seems to us that there must be a joint effort to translate sociological knowledge
into social action. The skills of the sociologist as a social theoretician and a
research investigator, and the skills of the social workers as a designated agent
of social change in the society can be used for the solution of social problems.
There is some reason to believe that social work is making greater efforts
in this direction than is sociology. Some doctoral programs in social work
appear to be providing training that integrates the skills of social science and
social work. The importance of this integration of skill and understanding cannot be underestimated. It is to be hoped that social science, in general, and
sociology in particular, will also develop such integrated programs for the
development of new agents of social change.
The increasing attention that decision makers are paying to social science
indicates that social scientists will increasingly be called upon to utilize their
skills in areas of social relevance. In meeting these social concerns—in seeking
ways to solve rather than rearrange social problems there may be a rapprochement between social work and sociology as both disciplines bring their best
thinking to bear on these issues.

Notes
1. Frank (1949) defines a social problem as any difficulty or misbehavior of a fairly large number
of persons which we wish to remove or correct.
2. Eglinton (1964) argues that there is perhaps one other way of "solving" a social problem: to
legalize actions heretofore labeled "illegal," "deviant," or "sinful." One example of such a
solution might be seen in the repeal of the 18th Amendment, another in Parliament's move to legalize
homosexuality in England. This is a technique of solving social problems by revising the sanction
system of a society. The argument that legalizing ancient Greek patterns of homosexual love between
a patron and an adolescent boy would solve a social problem by reducing alienations of the adolescent
from the adult world, i.e. juvenile delinquency. By legalizing homosexuality, Eglinton argues, one
would resolve two social problems, homosexuality and juvenile delinquency—an interesting, but
hardly respectable idea, at this time.

106

SOCIOLOGICAL PRACTICE/1989

3. Case (1964) discusses social problems as results of social processes, themselves part of social
change.
4. Roosevelt (1935) statement upon signing of the Social Security Act, August 14, 1935.
5. Galbraith (1958) discusses two forms of poverty in the United States, i.e., "case poverty" and
"insular poverty." One is located in some defect in the individual, the other is some type of social
dislocation. What may ameliorate one type will only confuse the other.
6. Furie (1966) discusses the adverse reaction to social planning by persons who must undergo the
"psychological-motivational" assessments of professional social workers in order to benefit from a
social plan. See also Lubove's (1965) discussion of the development of social casework as an
alternative to social reform.
7. Fried (1963) discusses the effects of forced urban relocation.
8. Beyer (1965), Wilner et al (1962), Jacobs (1961) report, for example, a recent study of persons
living under slum conditions which does not show large differences between the groups in regard to
more adequate or health life styles.
9. United States Department of Labor (1965) in a recent publication of the Office of Policy Planning
and Research, The Negro Family, reviewed the crises in race relations and argued that the solution
to the social problem created by the emerging Negro movement called for a new approach: "A
national effort is required that will give a unity of purpose to the many activities of the Federal
government, in this area, directed to a new kind of national goal: the establishment of a stable Negro
family structure" (emphasis ours). This is an interesting answer to a large minority group's claim
to social justice—i.e., full citizenship and social justice can be granted only to persons with middle
class nuclear family backgrounds! While the present power structure of the country may be in the
hands of persons who seem to have such family backgrounds (with certain notable exceptions) it
does not seem to follow that full participation of Negroes in the economic and political life requires
a stable family structure. Some might argue that the present middle class family structure creates as
many problems as it is reputed to solve. The divorce rate, the neurosis rate, and the suburban gang,
reveal that middle class family life may, in fact, drive its members into sterile, power-laden,
conformist actions which constitute a great barrier to the basic tenets of democracy. Thus, while the
civil rights movement calls for social justice, the suggested solution in this report calls for personal
and family changes not clearly related to the claim for economic and political freedom. Also see,
Rovere (1966) for an account of some of the furor such middle class oriented recommendations
made among the various spokesmen of the civil rights movement. Also see, Rainwater and Yancey
(1966). They point out that the report itself attributes the breakdown of the Negro family to social
and economic conditions. However, because of the way the material was released to the public, the
demand for the strengthening and restructuring of the Negro family was perceived, and reacted to,
as the major message. In this instance, then, the major social response was to the perceived content,
and not necessarily the actual content, of the report. However, the insistence that the Negro family
emulate the white family in organization, structure, and motivation, is part of the report, and
represents an interesting displacement of a social problem from social conditions to individual
characteristics of the problem group!
10. Although, this was true when this was first written during the summer of 1966, it is even more
true today, when what are perceived as excesses by civil rights militants exacerbate problems without
providing solutions. The actions of groups opposed to military involvement in Vietnam also have
many characteristics of exacabatory responses, particularly since their call for unilateral de-escalation
of the conflict or total withdrawal is not seen as a viable alternative by most of the population, not
to mention the primary decision-makers. Nor do they appear to have given thoughtful consideration
to the consequences of an unilateral decision to withdraw, any more than the proponents of further
escalation appear to have considered—at least publically—the consequences of continued escalation.
So far, the "peace groups" have been able to do nothing but protest, without, apparently, effecting
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policy. Hence, symptom exacerbation results. On the other hand, it is certainly not clear that any
other action is open to them at this point in time.
11. Kallen (1966) states that the recent distribution of a questionnaire on Scientific Manpower
Resources by the American Sociological Association tends to perpetuate this distinction: sociologists
were given the choice of self-identifications as "applied" or "theoretical."
12. Supreme Court (1954) recognized that the decision desegregating public schools was based, in
part, on social science evidence that separate schools were inherently unequal. But since that time,
little use has been made of social science in the solution of a series of racial crises.
13. Ross (1965) calls upon the scientific associations to "design the means by which social problems
which science can help are brought to the attention of scientists, and whatever in science is relevant
to those problems is brought to the attention of the appropriate laymen."
14. Bendix (1945-46) comments on the interesting formulation of the scientist-social actor conflict.
He stated: "This ambivalence in the role of the social scientific indicates that in our culture the
inherent radicalism of the scientific approach is either neutralized by turning social scientists into
professional employees or that it is emasculated by confining them to the academic preserve."
15. Howard (1784) reported on the state of prisons in England and Wales, with preliminary observations and an account of some foreign prisons and hospitals.
16. Eckland (1967) feels that recent theorizing suggests that there may be some truth to this assertion,
although for reasons different than those suggested by the social workers attribution of personal
quality. Eckland, for example, makes a strong case for the differences in the genetic pool of different
social classes, with the lower class having less genetic potential.
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Sociology as Advocacy: There are No
Neutrals

James H. Laue
I have tried to indicate that sociology's dominant conception of both "the
just society" and of intervention approaches to achieve justice are grounded in
doctrines of persons and society which stress human fulfillment as the ultimate
goal, and rational, data-based social decision processes as the appropriate
means.
Now we come to an analysis of sociology's conception of advocacy, which
must begin with the assertion that all human social action (including the doing
of sociology) is (a) value-laden and (b) political. That is, all action (a) requires
choice among alternatives (whether conscious or not, with not deciding being
as value-laden as deciding) and (b) exercises power and affects the power
configuration of the social systems involved.
I shall argue in this and subsequent sections that doing sociology in all its
forms is social intervention, and that all intervention is advocacy of one of three
types—of party, outcome or process. Given these conditions, there are no
neutrals in terms of their impact on given power configurations, and any sociologist claiming to be "neutral" in anything other than the strictest technical
sense is naive, misinformed, and/or devious. The conceptions of intervention
and advocacy developed here are intended to be applicable to all forms of
discipline-based and professional action.
Social Problems: The Root of Sociological Advocacy
The concept of social problems is at the basis of virtually every contemporary conception of sociological advocacy. "Social problems" is the most firmly
established sub-field of sociology, as evidenced by the 25-year existence (and
Excerpts pp. 172-184 from "Advocacy and Sociology," in G. Weber and G. McCall (Eds.), Social
Scientists as Advocates. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1978. Reprinted by permission.
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contemporary strength) of the Society for the Study of Social Problems, and its
journal, Social Problems. Most of the 24 recognized specialities and sections
within the American Sociological Association deal with issues or institutional
systems that are considered to be problematic for one reason or another—
medicine, education, aging, deviance and world conflicts, for example.
The viability of the sub-field of social problems is visible in the comprehensive and useful issue of Social Problems devoted to "SSSP as a Social Movement" (Colvard 1976). Hundreds of persons, most of them sociologists, worked
in task forces and other research arrangements to analyze the field, the Society,
and the journal Social Problems. A thorough review of the issue leaves one with
a feeling of the vitality of social problems theories, networks and research
efforts.
Definitions of social problems abound as textbooks and articles continue
to proliferate. While the definitions differ, it is clear that most sociologists agree
that there does exist a class of phenomena which may be appropriately labeled
"social problems." With Kohn (1976:94) in the Social Problems special issue,
my preference is for "a broad definition . . . that includes any social phenomena
that have a seriously negative impact on the lives of sizable segments of the
population."
Different approaches to the etiology of social problems may provide at least
implicit guidelines for meliorative attempts by sociologists and other problemdefmers. Rubington and Weinberg (1971) analyze five different sociological
perspectives on social problems, each with its own practice implications: social
pathology, social disorganization, value conflicts, deviant behavior and labelling.
"Social problems," then, is the label for the cluster of ideologies and
conceptions that is at the root of sociological efforts at advocacy, two other
traditionally valued orientations in sociology provide the vehicle and conception-of-outcomes for responding to social problems (in some rubrics, "solving"
them)—social policy and social change.
Social Policy and Social Change: The Pursuit of Justice
There seems to be an emerging consensus in the field that social policy is
the most appropriate vehicle for applying sociological understandings to the
amelioration of social problems (Freeman and Sherwood, 1970; Etizioni, 1973;
Rainwater, 1974; Horowitz and Katz, 1975; Lee, 1976). Social policy research
is critical, comprehensive, reality-testing, alternatives-generating, and appropriate for small demonstration or quasi-experimental field projects. Sociologists
are among numerous social scientists currently benefiting from the need of
governmental agencies to know, to plan, to evaluate and to traffic in expertise.
Freeman and Sherwood's view of the "key role of the social-policy
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scientist" is precisely what would follow from the human fulfillment criterion
for justice noted in the first part of this paper:
The social-policy scientist seeks to mold a social order that is more
consistent with human needs and human dignity. He searches for the
causes of social problems and attempts to specify the conditions
which will achieve a better state of affairs. He views any particular
social arrangement as only one of many. Thus, he often challenges
the status quo. Perhaps most important, he asks what institutions
and what course of action are most likely to meet the needs and
enhance the dignity and self-fulfillment of man (1970:22).
Social policy, adequately researched and planned by the sociologist-reformer, is believed to create new social arrangements and to redistribute resources—which, therefore, "solves social problems," i.e., moves the system
toward justice. This is social change—the third cornerstone of sociology's predominant conception of its advocacy role.
But sociologies' conceptions of social change still suffer, for the most part,
from an Enlightenment hangover. "Social change" has a generally positive ring
to the sociologist: Bash argues (1977) that in its earliest conception, social
change "was almost unanimously construed as 'progress'." Students prepare
for careers in social change; agencies promote social change. But social change
means the continually shifting patterns (sometimes dramatically so) of distribution of power and resources, and those redistributions may take a variety of
forms, ranging from revolution to consciousness-raising and institutional reform
on the left, to increased social control, status quo-ante conditions, or political
repression on the right.
This is the scenario of advocacy (often implicit) on which sociologists base
their activities: research on social problems which interest them, which is expected to influence the development of social policies which will produce desired social change. The uni-directional scenario becomes a loop, of course,
when social changes engender new social problems—usually unintentionally—
to which policy solutions must be addressed.
Modalities for Sociological Advocacy
Numerous specific activities have been undertaken by sociologists in their
advocacy of truth and specific policies. It is important to record at least some
of them to indicate the range and diversity of the discipline's practice approaches beyond the traditional teaching, research and publication. They include community organizing, training, passing resolutions, picketing and other
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forms of direct action, formation of radical and ascription-based caucuses in
professional associations, other internal political action within professional associations (the write-in victory of Alfred McClung Lee for the Presidency of the
ASA in 1975 is the best example), signing petitions, making videotapes rather
than publishing findings (for greater accessibility to "the people"), conscious
institution-building, networking (see Duhl and Volkman, 1970), and lobbying
and litigation.
It is clear, then, that sociology is "practiced" in a variety of ways and
settings (i.e., the members of the discipline advocate, at the minimum, their
ways of viewing social phenomena as "better" or "more truthful"), with wideranging conceptions of appropriate outcomes for the host systems. The dominant
ways may be summarized as truth-finding (research) and truth-telling (teaching,
consultation, testimony and various forms of policy advice). The dominant
settings are the university, the professional journal, the private or public agency
program, the legislative hearing, and the popular media. The dominant desired
outcomes are, in Kelman's (1968:9–10) terms, "the advancement of human
welfare, the rationality of social decisions, and the achievement of constructive
social change."
How is it possible to organize and understand the wide range of methods
and forums utilized by sociologists in expressing their advocacies? We approach
the problem in two ways: first, through examining several formulations of the
social roles and functions of sociologists and other social scientists, and, second
through an analysis of the three types of advocacy—party, outcome, and process.
Social Roles and Functions of Sociologists. Herbert Kelman (1968),
1976–77 chairperson of the Social Psychology Section of the American Sociological Association and a major spokesman for a systematic ethics of social
science, proposes three analytically distinct roles in which the social scientist
"practices:"
— Producer of social forces (through research findings and other activities
that may affect social policy);
— Experimenter and social thinker (the classical scientist/scholar role); and
— Participant in social action ("a role defined in nonprofessional terms,
but to which his standing and knowledge as a social scientist have
obvious relevance.")
Most sociologists see their "practice" as centering in the first or second
roles, whether in the classroom, in publication or in the field.
In another formulation, Gans (1967: 443—448), noting "that the sociologist
ought to be more than a detached researcher and that he should participate more
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directly in social-action programs," delineates the "role of sociology in planning against poverty" into four categories that can apply to sociological (or
other social science) advocacy regarding any problem:
—
—
—
—

Developing a theoretical scheme to guide planning;
Determining appropriate and feasible goals;
Program development;
Evaluation of action programs.

This scheme accurately describes the major roles of the sociologist-practitioner in a program agency, I believe, and is discussed in connection with an
analysis of types of advocacy later in this section.
Howard Becker answers the question of what social scientists can contribute
to dealing with social problems with the following list of five activities—all of
them squarely within the truth-finding/telling modality:
— Sorting out the deferring definitions of the problem:
— Analyzing the assumptions made by the interested parties about the
problem;
— Testing various assumptions about the problem against empirical reality;
— Discovering strategic points of intervention in the social structures and
processes that produce the problem;
— Suggesting alternative moral points of view from which the problem can
be assessed (in Rainwater, 1974: 10–11).
Becker's 1966 S.S.S.P. Presidential Address clearly framed sociology as
an advocate for the subordinate and less powerful members of the social systems
in which sociologists work (Becker, 1967). His argument may be summarized
as a plea for "evening up the odds," especially between client underdogs and
service agency overdogs (who, in Becker's words, "usually have to lie" because they are responsible for services which "are seldom as they ought to
be"). By explicating the points of view of subordinates, minorities, or deviants,
sociologists help move them up the "hierarchy of credibility." With perhaps
unintentional symmetry, sociology thus reflects its own underdog status among
the disciplines in its practice roles and orientations.
Alvin Gouldner has contributed a wide range of insights to understanding
the place and purposes of sociology, notably through The Coming Crisis of
Western Sociology (1970) and For Sociology (1973). He joins the argument
with Becker by questioning "blind advocacy" for underdogs, and in essence
accuses Becker of being a lower-level reformer aiming at the managers of
service—providing institutions which are structurally corrupt by nature. Gouldner
wants the sights of sociological advocates set on the real overdogs who maintain
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the traditional liberal's welfare state for their own interests—corporate financiers and policy-makers. His own SSSP Presidential Address in 1962 argued
against the tradition of objectivity, "charging the value-free researcher with
being socially irresponsible" (Freeman and Sherwood, 1970:21), and calling
for professionalized disrespect of the existing order and for advocacy of change.
Sociology as Intervention: Three Types of Advocacy. Each of these
formulations is useful in categorizing the advocacy positions and activities of
sociologists. What is needed now, I believe, is a more general theory of social
advocacy which can help explain the nature and impact of the practice of
sociology (as well as other disciplines) on the clients, colleagues, administrators, politicians, and other publics it touches.
I began by asserting that all activities of sociologists are a form of social
intervention. Intervention may be defined as follows:
1.

*2.
*3.

A deliberate and systematic entering into a social setting or situation
(often a conflict situation)—
(a) By an outside or semi-outside party or parties;
(b)With varying degrees of legitimation conferred by the first and
second parties;
*(c) With the aim of influencing the course of events toward outcomes
which the intervenor defines as positive.
Every act of intervention alters the power configuration in the social
systems in which it takes place and, therefore:
Every intervenor is an advocate—for party, for outcome and/or for
process.

The last three elements of the definition deserve elaboration.
*l(c) Intervenors aim to influence the course of events in theintervention
setting in a direction which they define as positive. Each intervenor
has tolerance limits for acceptable outcomes; just any outcome will
not do. Family therapists, architects, lawyers, and college professors,
for example, operate from different world views, but each "knows"
the range of conditions within which outcomes of intervention must
fall to be acceptable—whether the coinage is family dynamics, buildings, litigated settlements, or concepts. All intervention is thus valuedirected; there are no "neutral" intervenors.
*2. Human social life is the process and product of decision. Social
decisions allocate scarce resources among persons and groups. Power
is the control of decisions. Every act of intervention affects the configuration of negotiable power in a given social system, increasing
the power of some parties, decreasing that of others. Therefore, every
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*3.

act of intervention—and especially the activities of conscious, goaldirected professionals—is an exercise of power, with positive consequences for some in their pursuit of their interests.
Every intervenor, therefore, is an advocate, despite self-perceptions
or public claims of "neutrality." Most intervenors advocate particular outcomes or advocate the case of one of the parties (typically their
client). The third type of advocacy is for a particular kind of process
to be followed in arriving at the outcome (see Laue, 1975b).

Analysis of the three ideal-types of advocacy proposed here can provide
an organizing framework for the various activities of practicing (i.e., all) sociologists. But first definitions and qualifications regarding advocacy are in order.
Advocacy and advocates have received considerable treatment in the nonsociological literature in the last ten years. Among the elements which have been
defined as crucial to the role of advocate are:
— Alignment with the interests of disadvantaged subgroups who heretofore
have not been in a position to articulate their needs in the process of
community decision-making, with the objective of effecting a redistribution of public resources from the most advantaged sectors of the
community (Davidoff, 1965).
— Provision of leadership and resources directed toward eliciting information, challenging the stance of service institutions, and arguing issues
in behalf of disadvantaged clients (Grosser, 1973).
— Utilization of the expertise of professionals to defend the interests of
low-income community groups in the policy process. . . . Assisting the
poor, black and Third World minorities to compete successfully in the
influence process as a way of compensating for "an imperfect pluralism
(Guskin and Ross, 1974)."
But a much broader conception of advocacy is required if the concept is to
have utility beyond the limited settings described in the preceding definitions.
For, in fact, every act of intervention by every professional affects the power
configuration in the target system—whether that system is a classroom, agency,
legislative body, neighborhood, courtroom, or intergroup conflict. Modern dictionaries offer derivations and definitions that cast the analysis of advocacy in
the comprehensive terms that are most productive for our purposes. Here advocacy means "to speak or write in favor of," "to plead or argue for something,"
"support," and "active espousal," in addition to the term's technical application to lawyers in litigation:
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Advocacy, as utilized in this paper, means acting in support of a
particular party, outcome and/or process in a social situation.
Acting encompasses writing, talking, and other forms of overt human social
action. Support may take the form of any of the activities engaged in by practicing sociologists. A social situation may include social systems or processes of
any size, structure, duration and dynamic.
The central focus of the analysis contained in this paper is on the three types
of advocacy—party, outcome, process. Every act of sociological practice represents one or a combination of these three advocacies. Dimensions of the three
types of advocacy are summarized in the accompanying Table 1.
Table 1 attempts to systematize some of the characteristics and activities I
have observed and practiced as a sociologist. It is intended to delineate some
of the categories for a general theory of advocacy for social scientists—not only
for sociologists. Sociology is no different than the other social sciences in its
approach to advocacy: the practitioners' worldviews and the subject matter may
vary, but the structural characteristics of intervention situations and the range
of loyalties available to the advocate for party, outcome or process are similar.
So, structural characteristics rather than self-conscious choice are the major
determinant of the impact and, therefore, the type of advocacy employed in any
intervention situation.
We start with the assumption that there are elements of all the three types
of advocacy in every interventive act; one cannot choose to limit his or her
impact to only one of the three areas. The table focuses attention on the predominant mode of advocacy employed by the practitioner, and proposes correlative conditions and characteristics. We also assume that most sociologists—
especially those in the truth-telling mode—generally are unaware of their work
as advocacy, for their professional training imparts values to the contrary.
Most of the cells in the chart are derived in response to questions about the
actual impact of social science intervention on actors, outcomes and processes
in the target systems. Regarding "Goals (A)'and "Targets (B)," for example,
activities which improve the perceived or actual advantage of a client or target
group may be labeled "party advocacy." The production of a considerable
volume of research findings by sociologists regarding the negative impacts of
racial discrimination have been a form of party advocacy—for blacks and other
minorities.
Perhaps the most typical form of advocacy represented in the research
activities of sociologists conducted outside the academy is "outcome advocacy." Here the target is social policies and the goal is to influence them in a
direction that squares with the values of the researcher.
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The focus of process advocacy is on the totality of interaction in a system,
with the sociologist always holding values about the most productive ways of
viewing the system and its processes, and often, in addition, about the process
of procedure that should be followed in ongoing decision-making and
problemsolving in the system. While in the first case the major impact of the
intervention ultimately falls on a party or parties (i.e., actors) in a social system,
and in the second case the impact is on social policies, in the case of process
advocacy the impact is on the way in which parties achieve outcomes—namely,
the entire range of social interaction.
The most important distinction made in the table is between the "Truth
Orientation (1)" and the "Change Orientation (2)" under "Practice Characteristics (C)." After examining the role formulations of Kelman and others, I
concluded that virtually all distinctions in practice approaches in sociology are
best understood by first determining whether the practitioner is primarily oriented to truth-finding and truth-telling or to promoting social change. Kelman's
three role types may be condensed into these two: Friedrichs' "priestly" and
"prophetic" paradigms represent the same distinction.
Applying this distinction does not imply that truth-oriented practitioners are
uninterested in doing change—only that they see their roles as predominantly
involving discovering and communicating social reality, usually coupled with
the unexamined assumption that truth somehow directly translates into good
policy. Similarly, the change-oriented sociologist is not disinterested in finding
and telling truth; indeed, his skills in doing so usually are at the base of his
ability to be an effective change-agent. But the ultimate professional and personal reward for him is more likely to be found in particular client, policy and
process outcomes (see C.2.e.) than in the professional approbation which is the
lifeblood of all who see truth rather than change as their predominant mission
(C.I.C.).
The predominant practice settings are consistent within two orientations:
truth-tellers are most at home in academic institutions and in the pages of
professional journals (C.I.a.); and change-doers are more likely to gravitate to
the public or private agency, to the popular media, and, on rare occasion, to
elected office (C.2.a.).
The predominant roles associated with the two orientations (C.l.b. and
C.2.b.) vary within advocacy types in this scheme. In each case for the truth
orientation, the role is related to research, whether as advocate, policy and pure
researcher. The range of roles is greater for the change orientation. Typical
client advocate roles include community organizer, trainer and field worker, and
the sociologist who chooses to direct his work toward actively influencing
change in favor of a given group will inevitably find himself assuming these
types of roles. The sociologist predominantly committed to policy change would
find high administrative or policy positions the most cordial practice setting.
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The most innovative and potentially influential roles for the sociologist/
change-agent cluster around process advocacy, where the commitment is to
promoting a process of social interaction that reflects such values as win-win
social exchanges, rationality, and democratic decision making. The mediator
assists in negotiations between disputing parties. The advocate mediator uses
his skills and base to empower the less powerful in preparation for fuller participation in the process. A variety of agency and social movement-related roles
attract process-oriented change agents with sociological training: program developer (the activities of sociologists in poverty, population, crime, and delinquency program development is noteworthy), formative evaluator, action researcher and trainer, for example.
Regarding the major practice approach of advocates, the distinctions again
are more complex for the change-oriented in contrast to the truth-oriented practitioner. Research, writing, and teaching is the basic modality for all truth-telling
(A.1.c.). The different requirements for effective advocacy in the change-oriented mode (C.2.c.) call for different kinds of approaches, skills, and risks.
Party advocacy requires political (i.e., power-related) action if the relative advantage of groups is to be altered. Policy changes require legislative and/or
administrative action. And the most effective way of promoting "good process"
is through the types of third-party activities listed in C.2.b.—mediation, action
research, training and the like.
Primary products of sociologists in the truth-telling mode (C. l.d.) are written materials. Again, the requirements for effective advocacy are more complex
for the change-oriented roles (C.2.d.); for the practitioner is committed to realworld outcomes in contrast to writing or talking about real-world outcomes.
Hence, client empowerment is the primary product of the change-oriented party
advocate, and various forms of policy statements (laws, budget allocations,
administrative guidelines and regulations) are the principal intended products
of change-oriented outcome advocates. The primary products of change-oriented process advocates include various forms of action and evaluation documents, programs and consultation activities.
Summing Up: Sociological Advocacy
In structure and impact, then, sociological advocacy is much the same as
other advocacies. The worldviews and the content may differ, but the practice
modalities and impacts cover the same range of alternatives. All sociological
activity is advocacy—whether for an intellectual viewpoint on social reality, for
the rights of a given set of actors, for a desired policy outcome, or for a specific
set of social process.
From the early days of the field—especially in the United States—the
subject matter of sociology and the values of sociologists have kept sociological
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"practice" (of even the most isolated/scholarly type) closely related to the
ongoing issues and problems of the host social system. So the history of sociology is a history of advocacy: at the minimum, advocacy for certain ways of
viewing society and its "problems," often in sharp contrast to the views of
politicians, ecclesiastics, secular humanists, agency bureaucrats, journalists and
the electorate.
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Changing the Definition of the Situation:
Toward a Theory of Sociological
Intervention

Roger A. Straus

ABSTRACT
The sociological intervention is identified as (1) directed at the operational definition
of the situation and (2) taking into account the multiple, interacting layers of social
participation framing human predicaments and their resolution. These are further
differentiated, employing case examples, in terms of mode of attack—direct, indirect,
or cooperative—and level of social context at which the intervention is directed—the
personal, group, organizational, or social world being described here as "quantum"
levels of interest. While others may conduct such interventions, the sociological
intervention is characterized as the special domain of the clinical sociologist.

Sociology, unlike medicine or psychology, has never sought to maintain
the strong disciplinary boundaries typical of "a specialty." Rather, in its historical posture of a generalizing social science encompassing the subject areas of
the other social/behavioral disciplines, sociology has freely disseminated to
others its findings, concepts, and methods while maintaining only a marginal
interest in "applied" work. Consequently, while our subterranean tradition of
clinical sociology reemerged around 1978, we have found it difficult to specify
exactly the special contribution or expertise of the sociological practitioner.
To limit the domain of clinical sociology to what self-identified clinical
sociologists do or have done would, if anything, be counterproductive, as Lee
(1973) and others have argued. As one who has been intimately concerned with
the problem of defining our field for some years now, I believe we are ready to
move beyond presentation of the variety of roles enacted by clinical sociologists
Reprinted with permission from the Clinical Sociology Review, 2(1984): 51-63. Copyright Sociological Practice Association.
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(cf. Straus 1979a) to tease out the underlying logic of approach characterizing
the specifically sociological intervention.
In this paper, then, I shall state my findings that, on the basis of analyzing
the published and unpublished literature of the field, the sociological intervention may be characterized as (1) directed at the operational definition of the
situation, in such a way as to (2) take into account the multiple, interacting
layers of social participation framing human problems and predicaments and
their resolution.
Contemporary practitioners of clinical sociology almost universally characterize themselves as humanists in Lee's sense of the term (1973). While extrinsic
to my general definition, this value orientation is useful when differentiating
clinical sociological practice from more conventional "applied social science"
(Lee 1978). Our interventions are aimed at empowering clients instead of simply
adjusting them to the "realities of life." Rather than adopt the expert's role of
prescribing a better or more appropriate reality for the client, we strive to
minimize interference with the client's worlds and values; rather than serve the
needs of "the system," we attempt to serve the needs of the human beings
comprising the social unit or system in question (Straus 1982).
Operational Definition of the Situation
Translation of social theory, concept, and method into practice necessitates
both theoretical eclecticism and some reworking of our usual formulations.
Thomas's "definition of the situation" (1931) is usually understood phenomenologically to mean that whatever a person or group believes or accepts
to be so is real in its consequences. While it is important to deal with socially
constructed realities at this intrapersonal level, since they form the basis upon
which conduct will be constructed by human actors (Blumer 1969), redefinition
of internalized meanings and cognitive maps is mainly a concern of sociological
counselors working with individuals and primary groups (Straus 1982). Most
sociological interventions are more concerned with the manifestation of these
"realities" in patterns of conduct and joint conduct being enacted by the individuals, groups, and/or systems under scrutiny.
Thomas's statement of the principle was somewhat ambiguous about the
nature of the definition of the situation, but was clear about the dialectical
relationship between the individual's definition and the definition of the situation presented[a] by others. These concepts are neatly summarized in Sarbin's
(1976) characterization of the dramaturgical perspective holding that
actors not only respond to situations, but also mold and create
them. . . . The interactions of participants define the situation. The
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units of interest are not individuals, nor organisms, not assemblages
of traits, but interacting persons in identifiable contexts.
It is the pattern of these interactions that corresponds to the operational
definition of the situation and that is the target of sociological invtervention.
Levels of Social Context
Both the original statement of definition of the situation and its dramaturgical operationalization are clear about the situated nature of conduct. They are
not so clear about the complex and many-tiered nature of social ecologies and
about how human behavior is situationally organized with respect to a subject's
concrete location within that total social context. However, clinical sociologists
are sensitive to the implications of how "social systems" at every level influence ongoing action. This sensitivity is then translated into practical actions
designed to mitigate negative interlevel influences and/or to use these dynamics
strategically to guide and stabilize positive change. As Freedman and Rosenfeld
have put it (1983), the clinical sociologist uses a paradigm of "the integration
of levels of focus" incorporating both "macro" and "micro" viewpoints.
Thus, the characteristic sociological intervention combines multiple foci: "the
group member, the groups to which the person belongs or desires to belong or
not belong, organizations, committees, subcultures, culture, and society."
In this paper it is necessary to adopt a typology of the various levels of
social context; clearly, how one slices the social continuum represents a pragmatic choice relative to one's purpose. For example, Parsons (1951) selected a
scheme appropriate to his theory of social action, while Lofland (1976) utilized
an entirely different model of "human systems." As my purpose here is to
describe sociological intervention generically, we will look at just four "quantum levels" of social participation: persons, groups, organizations, and worlds.
The first two of these correspond to general usage. Persons are social
actors defining themselves in conduct; for our purposes, they are their acts. The
routinized patterns of conduct colloquially referred to as "one's act" are framed
by (that is, organized in terms of) the culture of the worlds in which persons
participate and the roles they play in the various groups in which they are
involved.
Each level of social structure is viewed as the emergent pattern of routinized
conduct representing a dialectical synthesis between the next "higher" and
"lower" levels. Groups, then, would be conceptualized as persons with more
or less routinized social relations or roles. The actual role structure of the group
operationally defines that group. As groups necessarily establish at least tacit
patterns of relationship with other groups, they inevitably become tied into any
number of formal or informal organizations.
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A special usage of organizations is employed here: this level of organized,
identifiable intergroup relations is most often termed that of "social systems"
(Znaniecki 1934). However, since any interacting set of persons can be considered to form a "social system," and their relations can be analyzed in terms of
systems theory (von Bertalanffy 1968), it seems best to employ another term for
this structural level. Organizations, then, may range up through wider and wider
scales of intergroup relations from "formal organizations," corporations, and
associations to communities and governments. The operational definition of
organizations consists of their institutions, meaning the routinized patterns of
social relations often simply referred to as their "organization."
The highest level of social context in this typology is the social world.
This usage is adapted and expanded from Lofland's definition: "Complexly
interrelated sets of encounters, roles, groups, and organizations seen by participants as forming a larger whole are often and properly thought of as 'worlds,'
as in the phrases 'the business world,' 'the academic world,' 'the sports world' "
(1976:29). In the sense employed here, a world is operationally defined by its
culture, primarily the nonmaterial culture of norms, values, folkways, mores,
language, and technology differentiating its participants from members of other
social worlds. Those who share a subculture by definition share a world; largerscale worlds might include the entire society, the civilization of which it is a
part, and, possibly, Spaceship Earth itself.
The Sociological Intervention
If we identify the operational definition with the target of intervention, this
scheme generates the following taxonomy of sociological intervention:1
Level of
Participation
Persons
Groups
Organizations
Worlds

Target of
Intervention
Conduct
Role Structure
Institutions
Culture

The intervention itself will, in one way or another, involve a strategy of
redefining the situation. At the personal level, for example, sociological counseling might involve reconstruction of the client's assumptive realities and/or
social-behavioral tactics specifically designed to change his or her conduct in
everyday life (Straus 1979b). Unlike more conventional "psychological" or
"psychosocial" counseling, only minimal attention would be placed upon intrapsychic constructs such as defense mechanisms or personality traits. On the
other hand, integration of levels of focus leads the sociologist to approach a

TOWARD A THEORY OF SOCIOLOGICAL INTERVENTION

127

person's difficulties at this personal level as social problems intimately tied to
cultural and subcultural factors, location in history and society, reference
groups, family dynamics, and the social construction of reality. Straus (1979b)
has shown how, for example, obesity can be managed through a specifically
sociological intervention.
Modes of Intervention
Interventions may be organized in terms of three different modes: the direct,
indirect, and cooperative. These represent different strategies for attacking a
problem. In real life, interventions generally combine one or more modes, but
it remains valuable to consider them as ideal types when thinking about and
planning change projects.
By "direct mode" I refer to the commonsensical approach of attacking a
problem head-on. One might assess a troubled organization, devise a strategy
of intervention, and then guide management in implementing the suggested
changes. Since this requires the change agent to take the role of expert or
"doctor," it tends to conflict with humanist values and is therefore more typical
of the social engineering approach than sociological intervention. On the other
hand, while the direct mode can provoke resistance and socialize clients to rely
upon external authority and "expert" guidance, it remains an invaluable tool
in the sociologist's kitbag. In fact, it is often expedient or even necessary to
take an initially authoritarian role prior to weaning the client to a position of
self-management (Straus 1977).
Indirect interventions enable one to avoid problems of resistance and dependency by employing tactics of indirection and/or indirect attack. The former
was pioneered by noted hypnotherapist Milton V. Erickson (1980), who developed the strategy of "indirect suggestion." The approach has been popularized
in consulting circles as "neurolinguistic programming" and has been adapted
to social science-based interventions by those affiliated with the Mental Research Institute in Palo Alto (Watzlawick, Weakland, and Fisch 1967). In family
therapy, for example, indirect tactics might involve getting family members to
cooperate with the identified problem behavior of a child, so as to get the parents
to stop doing whatever they have been "doing about it," thus blocking perpetuation of an operational definition aggravating or maintaining the family system's
problem (Fisch, Weakland, and Segal 1982).
Indirect attack is more typical of sociological intervention as practiced by
clinical sociologists; the problem is resolved by directing redefinition efforts at
higher and/or lower levels of social participation than that at which the identified
problem lies. Cheek and Baker (1977) found that subject resistance and ethical
problems associated with resocialization programs for prison inmates could be
avoided by organizing "self-control training" programs for inmates. This
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created the latent function of reducing recidivism—the identified problem—
which occurs at the organizational level of the criminal justice system.
Cooperative intervention tends to be favored in principle by clinical sociologists. In this mode the client's active participation in the change process becomes the key feature of the intervention (Lippitt and Lippitt 1978). Those who
will be affected by the intervention are helped to participate in or even take
primary responsibility for making decisions about and implementing the redefinition process; the role of the sociologist becomes, more than anything else,
that of a facilitator (Glass 1981).
The cooperative mode may also be employed in social research to increase
the study's clinical value (Leitko and Peterson 1982). Jaques's "social analysis" techniques (1982) might typify the "pure" cooperative intervention. However, in many cases (as when the situation is highly politicized and marked by
considerable power differentials) the facilitator role may prove too cumbersome
or simply impractical. A pure cooperative approach may also not fit the sociologist's personal strengths or style; in such cases, a mixed-mode approach will
be followed.
In practice, the principle of eclecticism extends beyond theory to mode.
Cases of actual sociological intervention generally display considerable theoretical eclecticism, an admixture of modal strategies, and elements of indirect
approach designed to take advantage of the integration of levels of focus. In any
case, the change agent can only benefit from clarifying the modes of intervention being employed.
The Personal Level
I will now flesh out these principles by discussing a variety of sociological
interventions that show how these practices relate to the taxonomy. Direct
intervention at the personal level, while the logical beginning point, is the most
difficult to differentiate from the conventional practices of psychotherapy and
counseling, but subtle—and highly significant—differences can be seen.
Even though most practitioners working at this level are associated with the
microsociological paradigm of the Chicago School, they focus upon the person
as member of society and not just as "an individual" with private problems.
They employ a social perspective in analysis and design of intervention that
focuses upon (1) the client's actual conduct in everyday life; (2) the internalized
sociocultural realities that frame and organize that conduct; and (3) the relationship between these realities, the person's conduct, and his or her situation in
terms of the various levels of social context (Powers 1979a, b; Straus 1979b).
Sociological interventions, whether direct or indirect, may often take clearly
social forms, as in directing clients to appropriate community support networks
to reinforce their definitions of the situation, or to peer self-help groups to help
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them reconstruct their realities outside of a therapy framework (Glassner and
Freedman 1979; Straus 1982).
Indirect approaches more clearly illustrate the special features of a sociological approach at this level. Coombs (1980) describes a drug and alcohol
abuse prevention program offering a dramatic alternative to conventional asocial
models which seek to scare youths away from experimentation or to treat identified users on the presumption that only sick, deviant, or deficient personalities
become abusers. His approach is aimed at individuals who are in a marginal
position and are likely to adopt substance-abusing identities—generally those
of junior-high-school age. Coombs intervenes by working with the family
groups of identified marginal youth so as to enhance family solidarity, keep the
family as the youth's primary reference group (rather than drug-abusing peers),
and remedy deficits in family skills such as communication, doing things together, or working as a group. Thus, the goal of defining the subject's conduct
in a prosocial direction is accomplished indirectly, through what Coombs calls
"family strengthening." In this kind of program, the indirect attack becomes
the sociologist's primary tactic. Minimal attention is given to substance abuse
itself or to correcting antisocial behavior; these are dealt with through indirect
intervention at the group level.
The Group Level
Interventions at the group level are primarily directed at role structure,
taking into account such factors as authority relationships, consensus regarding
roles and their boundaries, degree of involvement in roles, role strain or conflict, informal versus formal realities, and the degree to which the operational
definition of the group facilitates or hinders attainment of its collective purposes
(see Capelle 1979). A nonsocial approach at this level can certainly be found
in the practice of many marital therapists or business consultants, but such an
approach becomes difficult to justify given the manifestly systemic nature of the
social group, in which the whole is conspicuously more than the sum of its
individual parts.
A direct sociological intervention might be exemplified by William Foote
Whyte's solution to a restaurant chain's problems of inefficiency, worker dissatisfaction, and high turnover. He found that there were problems in the role
structure of these restaurants. Waitresses, who were women, were placed in a
position of giving orders to the higher-status cooks, who were male: those of
relatively lower status were giving orders to their nominal superiors, a problem
compounded by a violation of gender roles then current in American culture.
Whyte's solution was to resolve role strain by a simple mechanical expedient:
employment of rotating metal bands with clips on them—known as "spindles"—which allowed waitresses to post their orders in systematic fashion
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without having to convey them verbally to the male cooks. The changes incurred
by this intervention were so dramatic that something of the sort has become
standard throughout the industry. Note how this intervention related the role
structure of the group to the broader norms governing conduct in the general
society.
Cooperative intervention at this level is illustrated by Kleymeyer's organization of the "Program for Humanization of Health Care in the University
Hospital" at Cali, Colombia (1979). The sociologist was initially recruited as
part of a quantitatively oriented research team investigating the causes behind
disuse of outpatient services. He trained some of their native interviewers to
conduct field observations of service delivery in their spare time. Evaluating
their reports, he found that the public considered services dehumanizing, anxiety provoking, and alienating. He was then invited by the hospital's leadership
to devise strategies to mitigate this situation.
Recognizing the potential problems for an outsider in trying to impose
change from above, Kleymeyer chose to adopt the role of costrategist, instigator, and facilitator of change. He allowed the political savvy head of human
relations for the hospital to do the actual moving and shaking. In selecting,
designing, evaluating, and fine tuning innovations, he drew upon key hospital
personnel, client interviews, professionals on the scene, and workers' forums
that had been developed early in the change project, so that intervention was
permitted to take a locally generated and self-directing course. These innovations included courses in human relations and first aid for hospital staff, workers' forums, creation of an in-house position of "patients' representative,"
material incentives for humane and competent treatment, and other changes
involving training personnel in necessary role skills, redefining existing roles,
or developing new patterns of social relations. By this strategy, Kleymeyer
sought to establish a permanent, self-perpetuating, participatory institutional
structure that would outlive his contractually limited tenure in the hospital
setting.
The Organizational Level
Strategies at the organizational level represent, for the most part, an elaboration of group-level tactics. However, redefinition is primarily aimed at the
institutionalized patterns of relations between groups rather than role relations
within the group.
Direct tactics, although often too straightforward, can be effective. For
example, Trist (1981) describes an intervention in the Norwegian shipping industry. Onboard facilities were redesigned to promote a sense of community
among the various crew and officer groups who must live together under isolated
conditions twenty-four hours a day over extended periods of time. Redefinition
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of the shipboard environment to facilitate this new pattern of social relations
included creating common recreation rooms and dining halls where all ranks and
ratings could mingle (normally each group ate and socialized independently in
status-graded facilities); integrating deck and engine room crew; and reducing
status differentials between officers and crew.
An example of indirect approach has been described by Freedman and
Rosenfeld (1983), who were invited by the New Jersey Division of Mental
Health and Hospitals to assist in the implementation of mandated changes aimed
at humanization of services and expediting the release of clients to their local
communities. Their initial assignment involved implementing a new standardized record-keeping system for the six state hospitals. It soon became obvious,
however, that there was no real agreement, even among leadership, as to precisely what was desired or how to go about doing it. Furthermore, true implementation of the new policies would require significant redefinition of roles,
relations between various groups within the hospital system, and even meanings
of basic terms such as case management or team approach.
To forestall conflict and yet implement these major redefinitions, they
devised an indirect strategy centered on the introduction of the new form. As is
usual in such organizations, a training program was instituted concerning the
use of this form. In this case, however, both the design of the form itself and
that of the training program were deliberately organized to have the latent
function of redefining roles, institutions, and the culture of this system. Thus,
an ostensibly limited and innocuous innovation—a new record-keeping technology—was used as an indirect strategy for organization-scale change.
Cooperative strategies at this level have long been a staple of sociological
practice (Shostak 1966; Jaques 1982). However, this kind of approach has only
recently been extended to areas such as the management of social impacts from
government or industrial development projects. "Social Impact Management"
(Preister and Kent 1984), for example, brings members of communities to be
affected by large-scale projects into the process of negotiating and working out
a mutually acceptable plan to deal with issues and manage potential impacts
that will be compatible with or actually benefit those affected by the proposed
development. Special care is taken to identify and involve community networks
and to mitigate impacts at all levels of the local context so as to maintain the
integrity of community life and organization.
The World Level
At the highest scale we are considering, that of social worlds, sociological
interventions can take even more complex forms. For Lee (1979) the direct
approach at this most macrosocial level is identified with humanistically framed,
change-oriented research; he views the sociological clinician as seeking to
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understand through first-hand materials how socially organized situations actually function and how they can be influenced; he then suggests practical strategies for modifying or coping with problematic social realities, trends, and developments. His work has included the study of propaganda in our society with the
goal of sensitizing the broad public to the problem and generating the necessary
consciousness to defend them from this kind of manipulation. Significantly, his
major work on the subject was published in 1952, during the rise of the cold
war mentality and rapid expansion of the advertising profession. Clearly his
intent was to generate cultural defenses against the manipulation of society by
elites.
California's "Friends Can Be Good Medicine" campaign is a good example of a world-scale intervention combining both indirect and cooperative
modes. By devoting a small fraction of its annual mental health budget to this
preventive intervention, the state hoped to combat rising demands upon its
health and mental health systems. Its strategy was based upon the copious recent
literature documenting the inverse relationship between involvement in primary
groups and the rates of incidence of mental and physical health problems (see
Hunter 1982 for a summary of the literature). Its plan was to bring about a
change in culture by raising the general consciousness regarding the direct
personal benefits of developing and maintaining social support networks
(Hunter 1982). This strategy therefore incorporated both indirect and direct
attack.
Delivery utilized a cooperative approach. The consulting firm hired for the
campaign developed printed training and information materials, audiovisual
training films, and a series of radio and television spots stressing the message
that "friends can be good medicine." Ten paid coordinators then recruited
volunteer regional coordinators (I was one) from county agencies and networks.
After a trainers' workshop, these volunteers then recruited and trained community-level leaders from education, the churches, business, government, and
other local networks to deliver workshops and set up local events during the
month of June 1982. The entire state was to be saturated by community-based
consciousness-raising events supported by a media blitz—all at minimal cost to
the state. This was the first statewide mental health prevention program to date.
This campaign, designed exclusively by psychologists and "applied behavioral scientists," illustrates as well some of the pitfalls stemming from exclusion
of sociologists from organizing and implementing sociological intervention. In
this case, the "cultural approach" historically associated with clinical sociology
(Wirth 1931) would have had dramatic impact. Instead, the beautifully designed
and printed workbooks stressed the interests of "hip" humanistic psychologists—alternative life styles, consciousness-raising groups, and new games.
They were also written so as to require a high level of literacy and intellectual
orientation. In effect, they might have been designed to be rejected by rural,
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working-class, and poor people; businessmen; and conservatives: most of the
population, in fact. The materials also evidenced no awareness on the part of
their producers of the long-term macrosocial changes underlying the disruption
of traditional support networks and primary group structures, leaving the impression that alienation from significant others was a purely individual matter,
entirely correctable by personal action.
Between-Levels Intervention
It is important to point out that the model presented here can also be used
to typify interventions targeted at interpersonal, intergroup, interorganization,
and interworld problems. In essence, between-level interventions operate at the
next level upscale. An interpersonal problem would be treated as a blockage,
misalignment, or other difficulty at the group level. In solving such a problem,
one helps those concerned to work out joint definitions of the situation by
clarifying their respective roles and statuses. Intervention might involve improving communications, resolving contradictions in participants' definitions of the
situation, or creating entirely new, mutually acceptable definitions, including
recognition of their de facto status as a group. Except that our model typifies
interworld collectives simply as higher-scale social worlds, the same logic is
followed at the higher levels of between-levels intervention.
Conclusion
It has been my concern in this paper to tease out the generic logic and
structure of sociological interventions. By presenting this within a taxonomic
framework, I have sought to sensitize the practitioner to the special features of
the sociological approach and also to move a discussion of the substance of
clinical sociology up to a more concrete and hence manageable level.
Implicit in the foregoing is the premise that many or most problems encountered in social life, from the personal to the societal levels, can best be understood and dealt with as social problems. They cry out for sociological intervention, which is defined here as reconstructing the operational definition of the
situation with reference to the multiple, interacting layers of social context
framing any particular case.
Clinical sociology is not identical with sociological intervention, for both
sociologists and nonsociologists can and do engage in this form of work. However, it becomes apparent that the clinical sociologist is best qualified to practice
sociological intervention because the approach lies squarely in the domain
carved out by sociological training, sociological tradition, and the special sensitivities inculcated only by immersion in a specifically sociological perspective.
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Notes
1. Those specializing in sociological counseling or therapy at the personal level might wish to
discriminate a still more micro-scale intervention: the intrapersonal. Here, the client's phenomenological definitions of the situation as manifested in cognitive, psychomotor, and/or psychosomatic
self-interactions become the target for change (Straus 1983). However, these are still analyzed within
the context of a social problem framed by culture and group participation and managed similarly to
intervention at the molar "personal" level.
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Basic and Applied Sociological Work

Joseph R. DeMartini
Definition and Typology
For the purposes of this paper, applied sociology is the use of sociological
theories and/or methods to address issues of practical concern identified by a
client for which this use is intended. The crucial part of this definition of the
last phrase: "... identified by a client for which this use is intended." Applied
work is not focused upon the needs of the discipline as a social science; it is
designed to meet the needs of persons or groups who desire to employ information and knowledge for a specific end. I use the phrases "client oriented" to
describe the focus of applied work and "discipline oriented" to describe the
focus of academic or basic sociology.
These foci are compared in Figure 1 on three dimensions: goals, working
norms, and reference groups. Figure 1 is an ideal, typical statement. It identifies
the rationale and justification for basic and applied work without citing individual accommodations made by persons engaged in either work on a daily basis.
The goal of basic sociology, as in all basic science, is the construction of
valid and generalized knowledge statements. Hypothesis testing, theory building, and heuristic/exploratory research are incremental steps in building a body
of knowledge about the social world. While sociologists may fall short of
achieving this goal, working toward it is both a definition and justification of
the discipline as well as a measure of individual success and consequent prestige.
Working norms that guide knowledge production embody the scientific
method and corresponding rules for determining the validity and reliability of
empirical measurement. The rules that guide basic research emphasize the importance of withholding judgment until all available information is in as well
Excerpts (pp. 204–210) reprinted with permission from NTL Institute, "Basic and Applied Sociological Work: Divergence, Convergence, or Peaceful Co-existence?" by Joseph R. DeMartini, pp.
203–215, The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, Vol. 18, No. 2, Copyright 1982.
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Figure 1. Comparison of Basic and Applied Sociology in Terms of Goals,
Working Norms, and Reference Groups

as a willingness to live with considerable doubt that may never be resolved fully.
To ensure the integrity of knowledge produced through scientific research,
conclusions are often tentative and stated in terms of probability with recognized
margins of error.
Basic sociology is conducted with a specific audience in mind: the researcher's professional peers. This is the audience that will read and judge the
results of basic research. Even within a multiparadigm discipline like sociology,
a considerable body of knowledge is shared and taken for granted that helps
establish priorities and the terms by which research products will be recognized
as contributions toward the goal of knowledge production.
The goals of client-oriented applied work center on the use rather than
production of knowledge. Most often this use is of a singular nature: i.e.,
specific problems arise calling for specific solutions. Directed by these goals,
applied sociologists channel their efforts to provide information that usefully
bears on the problem(s) at hand. Efforts to produce useful findings frequently
are irrelevant to the goal of increasing the discipline's body of knowledge.
Problem solving and policy setting take place in political arenas. Within
these arenas the political process determines whose interests will be served, not
whose arguments and supporting data are more correct when judged by some
objective standard of validity. The adversarial nature of this process and the
rules that govern it directly impinge on the working norms that govern applied
sociology. Information is desired that will be persuasive over and against other
interest groups. Presenting research conclusions in a tentative light that recognizes possible sources of error and calls for further research is less useful than
presenting findings with an aura of certainty. The rules governing applied work
call for products that will be as effective as possible for the client who commissions them. Conflict between the demand for certainty and the norms of scientific research is probable (Levine, 1974).
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Applied work has at least two audiences—the person or group for whom a
final report is intended, and, at the next level, those populations to whom the
final report will then be reinterpreted and disseminated. Research findings must
be intelligible to persons not familiar with the research process and made clearly
relevant to the concerns of those who commission the work. The results of
applied work are seldom directed toward other sociologists.
I have associated basic and applied sociology with discipline-and clientoriented work and compared them on three dimensions: goals, working norms,
and reference groups. These distinctions highlight differences and suggest great
difficulty in merging the two types of work. A clarification and qualification are
necessary at this point.
Varieties of applied work
The definition of applied sociology as client oriented cannot and is not
intended to describe fully the variety of activities known today as applied work/
research.1 Both basic and applied sociology are more accurately presented as
points on a continuum with "discipline oriented" and "client oriented" denoting polar extremes. Figure 2 illustrates such a continuum. The six examples of
basic and applied work in this figure are not exhaustive, nor are they considered
equally important by members of the discipline. Over time, emphasis may shift
from one type of work to another, and new forms may emerge while existing

Figure 2. A Typology of Sociological Work from Basic to Applied
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types blend, combine, or fade away. 2 The significant factor about the continuum
is the pull exerted at each pole.
As in Figure 1, these extremes are best viewed as Weberian ideal types.
Seen from this perspective, sociological endeavors that fall at the center of the
continuum represent situations in which there is much dissension over appropriate goals, procedures, and measures of success. This viewpoint counters the
position that work at the center of the continuum is a smooth integration of
differing perspectives. Other common labels applied to this continuum are (from
left to right): sociology as social science, sociology as social critique, and
sociology as problem solving.
This continuum hints at the difficulty in making distinctions between sociologies. Basic sociology or sociology as social science is not a unified discipline. Debates over the lack of a single paradigm within the discipline reflect
the diversity of work taking place. A full presentation of basic sociology requires a three-dimensional figure specifying the many criteria by which sociological research can be defined: e.g., differing theoretical schools of thought,
methodological techniques, and underlying epistemologies.
Similarly, applied sociology encompasses a variety of activities that can
be grouped by several criteria—few of which are used to distinguish types of
basic work. Who is the client and/or potential user of applied work: national
government, regional or local government, private industry, the judicial system?
What is the intended purpose of this use: implementing government policy,
resisting proposed programs, effecting organizational change? Are the users of
applied work within or outside of existing centers of power? These and other
related questions influence the nature and form of applied sociology as well as
the probability and type of impact this work will have upon clients and target
populations.
In addition, the variety of applied work goals and settings raises professional and ethical questions regarding the use of sociological skills for client
use. Who can afford to purchase the often expensive array of social science
research skills? What are the consequences of unequal opportunity to pay for
these skills? To what extent are the products of applied work as much the result
of economic and political realities as they are functions of intellectual and
professional goals and standards? The nature of ethical issues along with variety
in the settings and forms of applied work bear directly upon the relationship
between basic and applied sociology. The next section explores this relationship
in some depth. While the diversity of applied work qualifies the generality of
conclusions that follow, I argue that connections between basic and applied
work are limited and points of contradiction exist, especially for policy analysis
and social problem-solving resparch.
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Linkages Between Basic and Applied Sociology
I shall explore the connection between basic and applied work. . ..
I. What relevance do the products of basic research have for applied
work?. . . .
Answers to (this) question are available in the literature on sociology's
impact upon social problem solving and policy decision making as well as in the
reflections of sociologists who have done applied work. . . .
Products
The growing literature on applied work is skewed toward research done for
the public sector at the federal level. Only a small portion of this literature
addresses the first question I pose here: i.e., what relevance do the products of
basic research have for applied work? In addition, materials on the use of basic
research (theory, method, or findings) for the conduct of applied work at regional and local levels or by persons attempting to effect social change are
extremely limited. As a result, the conclusions drawn in this section are restricted to the impact of sociological research upon policy decision making at
the national level.3
Policy makers and problem solvers do make use of sociological research
findings, but this use is often difficult to identify and seldom as direct and
influential as social researchers would like. Surveys of decision makers at various levels within Austrian federal and municipal government agencies found the
use of applied and basic social science knowledge to be "indirect," "diffuse,"
and "difficult to localize" (Knorr, 1977). Rich (1977) describes the use of
national public opinion data by seven United States federal service agencies as
"conceptual," i.e. ". . .influencing a policymaker's thinking about an issue
without putting information to any specific, documentable use" (p. 200). Patton
et. al. (1977) characterize the impact of federal health program evaluations as
contributing to a general clarification of relevant issues thereby stimulating the
"evolutionary process" out of which decisions and policy finally emerge.
Again, a direct impact upon the content and outcome of specific policies and
decisions was not evident.
The experience of sociologists on presidential commissions leads to similar
conclusions regarding the role played by sociological theory, method, and data
in the conduct and impact of national policy research. Komarovsky (1975) has
assembled detailed analyses by sociologists who served on presidential commissions between 1965 and 1972.
Empirical research in the classic social science tradition did not yield clear
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policy alternatives that could be incorporated into committee recommendations
(Larsen, 1975). Available social science literature lacked specific action
alternatives that could be translated into policy recommendations (Short, 1975).
When social scientists did provide recommendations, these were more frequently influenced by "personal ideological conviction" than by sociological
research and analysis. "The greatest strength of the social science contribution
lay in providing sensitizing concepts and theories which oriented the search for
solutions. ..." (Ohlin, 1975, p. 108). The inability of social scientists to identify the policy consequences of research findings and literature is a unifying
theme in these accounts of the commissions' work.
Two studies that focus on the characteristics of usable social science research are helpful in clarifying the relationship between applied and basic work.
Their findings suggest that these characteristics are at odds with those that
describe traditional, scholarly research products. Caplan examined the use of
empirically based social science knowledge—excepting standard economic research—by upper level United States government officials as part of policyrelated, decision-making processes. He identified over 500 self-reported instances of such use. What was used did not resemble typical scholarly research.
Hard knowledge (research based, quantitative, and couched in scientific language) was usually only of some instrumental importance,
and the final decision—whether or not to proceed with a particular
policy—was more likely to depend upon an appraisal of "soft"
knowledge (nonresearch based, qualitative, and couched in lay language). (Caplan, 1977, p. 188)
Van de Vail and Bolas (1980) reinforce Caplan's findings in their study of
social policy research and applied social research in the Netherlands. This
research examined the use of social science knowledge in the areas of industrial
and labor relations, regional and urban planning, and social welfare and public
health. Two findings are of interest to us here: (1) the utility of formal sociological theory and concepts, and (2) the utility of research conducted in accord with
traditional disciplinary standards of methodological rigor. On both accounts,
discipline-oriented (basic) research procedures had lower utility or impact scores
than procedures less characteristic of basic research. Projects that employed
formal theoretical concepts were utilized by decision makers less often than
research that employed grounded concepts of "low abstraction and simple construction." Applied research, which rated highly in terms of methodological
sophistication, correlated negatively with measures of utility or impact in all
three sectors of social/policy decision making.4 The authors conclude that:
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These findings suggest a number of theoretical, methodological, and
normative differences between the traditional academic paradigm
of social science discipline research and an emerging professional
paradigm of social policy research, (van de Vail & Bolas, 1980. p.
135)
Does this brief literature review suggest any conclusions about the relevance of basic sociology for the variety of applied work treated here? I offer
two:
1. Sociology functions to expand the outlook of decision makers. It offers alternative perspectives and questions standard myths.
It does not provide specific solutions or courses of action that might
be taken on the basis of sociological research. Nor does applied
work provide insight into social problem solving because of its
resemblance to basic research in the use of theory or method.
2. A change of perspective is most likely to occur when the
policy needs and alternatives of decision makers are made an integral part of the research process. Such an approach may undermine
the research product's contribution to sociological theory, but it is
mandatory if this product is to be of use to decision makers.
These conclusions are consistent with the "enlightenment" hypothesis,
which dates back at least 15 years to Gouldner's (1965) treatment of applied
work.5 They do not, however, simply confirm the accuracy of this hypothesis.
They significantly alter it by introducing the need to anticipate how research
findings and subsequent policy recommendations will be incorporated into the
decision-making process. Good social science does not automatically illuminate
aspects of a social problem for persons who must cope with that problem and its
consequences (Aaron, 1978). Alternative interpretations of why the problem
emerged and how it might be solved do not naturally flow from the conclusions
of applied research to the consciousness of those involved in policy making and
problem solving.
Applied researchers must plan for the careful interpretation and dissemination of research findings long before the research is completed. At the least, this
requires that researchers advocate to their clients the serious consideration of interpretations supported by research data even when these interpretations contradict
ideological preferences and political expediency. Maximizing the possibility
that social problem solvers will seriously consider the results of applied research
requires role activity not common to that of impartial scientific inquiry. . . .
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Notes
1. Nor do I suggest that one can meet the demands of applied work by drawing upon a single
discipline. The interdisciplinary character of the applied or policy sciences has been well documented. This paper focuses upon sociology because it is an area in which the problems of adapting
basic research to applied work are most apparent.
2. Several times on this continuum have experienced periods of increased popularity. An attempt to
explain the causes of social problems was most typical of applied efforts in the discipline prior to
World War I. Translating personal problems into social issues was championed by C. Wright Mills
in the late 1950s and became a foundation for activist sociology in the 1960s. Needs assessments and
program evaluations increased in the 1970s. Social impact assessment will probably grow during the
1980s as an offshoot of environmental impact assessment.
3. For examples of applied work at regional and local levels, see Alkin et al., 1979. The need for
social scientists to take an active role in promoting social change is often recognized, but very little
documentation of persons acting in this role is available. One notable exception is Shostak's anthology, Putting Sociology to Work (1974). I have omitted from this review of literature any reference
to the use of social science by the courts. Rosen (1977) and Collins (1978) provide a full listing of
the extent to which social science is increasingly introduced into judicial hearings. They agree,
however, on the absence of data that might verify the impact of such testimony. Overall, social
science testimony appears to support (i.e., legitimate) court decisions rather than determine their
outcome.
4. Weiss and Bucuvalas (1980) report an opposite finding; however, their research measured the
expected use of applied research findings while van de Vail et al., measured actual use.
5. I am indebted to an anonymous JABS reviewer for pointing out the elitist implications of the
"enlightenment" hypothesis. Social scientists who view their perspectives as intrinsically better than
the everyday understandings of policy makers harbor a narrow and counterproductive world view.
Such perspectives, however, very frequently are different from these understandings. This difference
expands the variety of analyses available to decision makers and is the essential contribution social
science offers under the unfortunate title of enlightenment.
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